The European Monetary Union--Lecture One

One big question hangs over the discussion of the European Montary Union and its currency the EURO--"Was it a bad idea?"

This question continues to divide scholars,  politicians, and ordinary citizens This question has loomed large esp. after the Greek Crisis 2010-2015 and was a factor in Brexit. (leavers complained that the EU had shafted the Greeks.) Even in recent newspapers, the Head of the Hungarian Central Bank has complained that the EURO must go. (Hungary is of course not a member of the EMU.)

The gist of his argument:

Two decades after the euro’s launch, most of the necessary pillars of a successful global currency — a common state, a budget covering at least 15-20 per cent of the eurozone’s total gross domestic product, a eurozone finance minister and a ministry to go with the post — are still missing. 

We rarely admit the real roots of the ill-advised decision to create the common currency: it was a French snare. As Germany unified, François Mitterrand, then French president, feared growing German power and believed convincing the country to give up its Deutschemark would be enough to avoid a German Europe. The chancellor of the time, Helmut Kohl, gave in and considered the euro the ultimate price for a unified Germany. They were both wrong. 

We now have a European Germany, not a German Europe, and the euro was un­able to prevent the emergence of another strong German power. But the Germans also fell into the trap of the “too good to be true” euro. The inclusion of southern European economies in the eurozone led to an exchange rate that was weak enough to allow the Germans to become the strongest global export machine in the EU. This windfall opportunity made them complacent. They neglected to upgrade their infrastructure or to invest enough in future industries. They missed the digital revolution, miscalculated the emergence of China and failed to build pan-European global companies. At the same time, companies like Allianz, Deutsche Bank and Bayer launched fruitless efforts to conquer Wall Street and the US. 

 Most eurozone countries fared better before the euro than they did with it. According to analysis by the Centre for European Policy, there have been few winners and many losers in the first two decades of the euro. The common currency was not needed for European success stories before 1999 and the majority of eurozone member states did not benefit from it later. During the 2008 financial crisis and the 2011-12 eurozone economic crisis, most members were badly hit, having piled up huge government debts. There is no free lunch and cheap loans often cost a lot later. 

....

The time has come to wake up from this harmful and fruitless dream. A good starting point would be to recognise that the single currency is a trap for practically all its members — for different reasons — not a gold mine. EU states, both in and outside the eurozone, should admit that the euro has been a strategic error. The aim of building a global western currency that vies with the dollar was a challenge to the US. The European vision of a United States of Europe has resulted in both open and hidden US warfare against the EU and the eurozone in the past two decades. We need to work out how to free ourselves from this trap. Europeans must give up their risky fantasies of creating a power that rivals the US. Members of the eurozone should be allowed to leave the currency zone in the coming decades, and those remaining should build a more sustainable global currency. Let’s celebrate the 30th anniversary in 2022 of the Maastricht treaty that spawned the euro by rewriting the pact.  

This is not a view I share.  The historical account is dubious ("a French snare") and--in my opinion-- a United States of Europe is the only way of avoiding subordination to Trump's America, Xi' China, and/or Putin's Russia.

Nonetheless, it is your task to figure out if this Hungarian chap is right.

One point worth noting--the EURO is not unpopular in Europe (although there is quite a lot of variation between different countries):

For a more recent discussion (May 2020) of whether or not the EU was a mistake, see the recent discussion between Stefan Auer, a notorious eurosceptic, and Erik Jones-- two eminent EU scholars.

TIMELINE (from The Guardian)

hares

1

1957
The treaty of Rome creates an early incarnation of the EU - the EEC - and identifies exchange rate policies as a "matter of common concern". Fluctuation between the national currencies was seen as a cause of economic instability. 25.3.1957: Unity plan in Europe

1961
An action committee advocating a united Europe proposes a European monetary reserve system as a step towards creating a single currency, though nothing happens until the next decade.

1969
EEC heads of state agree to establish an economic and monetary union by 1980.

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1970
In a move now seen as the start of monetary union, a report by Luxembourg's prime minister, Pierre Werner, suggests that the community moves to a single economy in 10 years, with a fixed exchange rate but no single currency. It is accepted but implementation falters as the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates between the US dollar and European currencies collapses.
19.10.1970: EEC plan a step to political unity

1972
European currencies - including those of non-EEC members - are linked through a "monetary snake", which permits currencies to move against each other within a 4.5% limit. But the 1973-74 oil price crisis forces out sterling, the Italian lira and French franc under pressure from the dollar.
8.3.1972: Six agree on monetary union deal

1979
The snake, by now including only Germany, Denmark and the Benelux countries, is replaced by the European monetary system (EMS). At its core is the exchange rate mechanism (ERM), designed to prevent anything but minor fluctuations between participating currencies. The European currency unit (Ecu) is introduced as an average of the participating currencies.
14.3.1979: EMS starts off with only a whimper

1989
European Community heads of state meet in Madrid and agree to implement economic and monetary union (Emu) in the three steps proposed by the head of the commission, Jacques Delors.
18.4.1989: Delors' plan

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1990
Emu stage one begins with the liberalisation of capital transactions and increased cooperation between national banks. Margaret Thatcher takes Britain into the ERM at what some analysts warn is an inflated rate.
8.10.1990: First step on the road towards full European monetary union

1992
February
The Maastricht Treaty, negotiated in the last months of 1991, is signed, setting out a path to the single currency. With January 1999 as the last allowable date for its introduction. Britain secures an opt-out from this final stage and the Danes reject it in a referendum.
12.12.1991: Maastricht Treaty hailed as great leap forward despite Major concessions

September
Currency speculation on "Black Wednesday" forces a run on the overvalued pound and John Major takes Britain out of the ERM.
17.9.1992: Pound drops out of ERM

1993
The ERM is suspended in August and relaunched in a looser form.
2.8.1993: EC surrenders battle for ERM
26.8.1993: Leader: Mapping the new Europe

1994
January
Emu stage two begins with the establishment of the European monetary institute (EMI) as a forerunner to the European central bank (ECB). Member states commit themselves to working towards currency convergence criteria.

April
Finance ministers settle on introducing the single currency in January 1999, with a three to four year transition period before the national currency notes and coins are replaced.
11.1.1994: Financial Notebook: Birth rites

1995
Heads of state and government decide on "euro" as the name for the new currency.
20.12.1995: European press reaction to naming of the currency

1998
The European Commission recommends 11 countries to participate in the first wave of monetary union: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The ECB is set up in Frankfurt and the exchange rates between the euro and national currencies are fixed on December 31.
31.12.1998, leader: The euro has landed

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1999
January 1
The euro comes into effect and the ECB takes over responsibility for monetary policy from central banks. It is principally used for non-cash transactions but the 11 currencies of the member states - such as the franc, peseta and lira - have ceased to exist in their own right and are now simply its subdivisions.
2.1.1999: Euro love is not enough

In the first half of the year the new currency, which was worth $1.17 on its launch, slides towards parity with the dollar and drops beneath it in December.
7.12.1999: Euro edges back above dollar

2000
The ECB intervenes for the first time in September to prop up the euro, which had lost 30% of its value against the dollar in its short life. A week later the Danes say no to joining the single currency in a referendum.
23.9.2000: Three strikes to save single currency

2001
January 1
Greece joins the euro.

August 30
Final design of euro banknotes unveiled. Mass advertising campaign begins, and notes and coins are distributed to major banks.
30.8.2001: ECB unveils euro notes and coins

December
Notes and coins are sent to retailers for training staff and mini-kits of notes and coins are distributed to the public.

2002
January 1
Euro notes and coins become legal tender in 12 countries and "dual circulation" begins.

January 28
The guilder ceases to be legal tender in the Netherlands.

February 9
The punt ceases to be legal tender in Ireland.

February 17
The franc ceases to be legal tender in France.

February 28
National currencies cease to be legal tender in remaining nine eurozone countries.

March 1
The euro is the only legal tender in 12 European countries.

June 30
Smaller banks stop exchanging national banknotes for euros.

October 9
The European Commission recommends that the EU accept 10 new member countries.

November 29
Euro hold-out Sweden sets a date for a national referendum on joining the single currency: September 14 2003.

2003
June 9
The chancellor, Gordon Brown, announces whether or not the five economic tests for Britain to join the euro have been met.

2012
January 1
National notes and coins may no longer be exchanged for free.

The Werner Report 1970 (initially discussed at the Hague 1969) represented the first proposal to set up a Monetary Union between the then 6 member states.  A contemporaneous article notices the federalist implications of the plan:

The Werner Committee's plan for economic and monetary union in the Common Market covers 31 pages. Its fundamental objective is "that the principal economic decisions affecting the EEC will be taken at community level, and that the necessary powers will be transferred to the community [i.e. will be transferred to the supranational level of government]."

The report envisages that by 1980 the Community would formulate budgets, tax policies, and monetary policies; and that there would be a uniform tax system throughout the Community.

It recognises that the transfer of these responsibilities to the Community has "a fundamental political significance and implies the progressive development of political union. The economic and monetary union, therefore, has to be seen as a generator for the development of a political union."

The document says that those must understand its objectives who subscribe to the project, and accept them without equivocation: "Political and monetary unification is an irreversible process and it is essential to go into it with a firm will to achieve it and to accept all its political as well as economic implications."

The Werner Report was shelved, mainly because of a series of global economic crises of the 1970s, including:

--the monetary crisis in 1971 (non-convertibility of the US dollar);

-- the first oil crisis in 1973;

-- the iron and steel crisis in 1974;

 --the economic crisis in 1975;

 --and the second oil crisis in 1979.

1979-1991 European Monetary System (EMS)

"The European Monetary System (EMS) was built on the concept of stable but adjustable exchange rates defined in relation to the newly created European Currency Unit (ECU) – a basket currency based on a weighted average of EMS currencies . Within the EMS, currency fluctuations were controlled through the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) and kept within ±2 .25% of the central rates, with the exception of the lira, which was allowed to fluctuate by ±6% ."

A new plan took shape in 1988 and was published as the Delors Report in 1989.

The idea of a European Monetary Union faced intellectual and political obstacles.

The intellectual obstacles came from economists, who in the 1960s and 1970s had formulated a theory of an Optimum Currency Area (OCA). For a useful summary of this theory, read pages 1-6 of Francesco Paolo Mongelli, “European Economic and Monetary Integration, and the Optimum Currency Area Theory.’’

Crudely stated, OCA—the work of economists like Robert Mundel, Peter Kenen, Ronald Mackinnon and others—sought to identify the conditions necessary for an economic area to share a common currency. Conditions include:

--price and wage flexibility

--mobility of factors of production (capital and labour)

 –product diversification

--openness

--financial integration

--fiscal transfers

--similarity of preferences concerning savings, debt, and life/work balance

--solidarity: are we a community of destiny? do we share your costs?

Why would a group of sovereign states want to set up a monetary union with a common currency?

ADVANTAGES:

1. Eliminate Transaction Costs--check out the currency exchange rates in an airport
2. Eliminate Currency Risk
3. Increases Global/Regional Power--Seniorage
4. Strengthens the Independence of the Central bank
5. Speeds up Economic Integration
6. Speeds up Political Integration (Ever Closer Union)

DISADVANTAGES

1. Countries give up the flexibility of exchange rate depreciation.
2. Absent currency depreciation; countries must rely upon wage deflation.
3. Very difficult to leave a Monetary Union--the Hotel California Problem (see Barry Eichengreen, The Euro: Love It or Leave It; and for a more detailed version, here)

Many economists pointed out in the 1990s that the EU lacked these conditions and a common currency wouldn’t work.

One can go through the 6 conditions of an OCA and argue that some or all are absent.

Source: Baldwin and Wiplosz (2011)

Among the most prescient critics:

Bernard Connolly, The Rotten Heart of Europe (1995)—(this guy was ignored for 15 years, a paraiah in EU circles, until the Greek crisis proved him right)  see interviews and profiles  here and here and here and here

Martin Feldstein, “EMU and International Conflict” (1997)

____  "The Political Economy of the EMU,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall 1997*

These economic objections were dismissed by pro-EU scholars, including this one published—with sad irony—in November 2009 just as the wheels were coming off. (Lars Jonung and Eoin Drea, It can't Happen, It's a Bad Idea, It Won't last: US economists on the Euro 1989-2002)

The Founding Fathers of the European Union

 I'm not sure that focusing on founding fathers is terribly helpful, given the structural forces driving the European nation-states towards some limited forms of integration in the post-war period. See splendidly skeptical note on the role of federalist inspired "founding fathers" expressed by Alan Milward in his The European Rescue of the Nation State. For Milward, the driving idea was not federalism (overcoming the nation-state) but limited integration as a means of rescuing the nation-state. This passage from Chapter Six of his book captures the key point:    

For a critique of the Milward thesis--namely, that European Integration represented an effort to rescue the nation-state rather than overcome or replace it--see Robert Bideleux, "European Integration: Rescue of the Nation-State," The Oxford Handbook of Modern European History (available on the course blackboard website).

My own view of this historian's dispute--both Milward and Bideleux are right and wrong. Like a lot of things that happen in life, people support projects for different, sometimes conflicting, reasons.  

Nonetheless, if one were going to focus on key individuals rather than structural factors; the usual suspects include:

Robert Schuman, 

Jean Monnet, 

Alcide de Gasperi, 

Henri Louis Spaak 

Konrad Adenauer.

Altierro Spinelli

One other figure sometimes makes this list--but I think he doesn't belong on it--is Winston Churchill  

Churchill's status as a founding father of European Integration is much contested.

Yes, his famous Zurich speech can be quoted in support of his position as a FF:

Yet all the while there is a remedy which, if it were generally and spontaneously adopted by the great majority of people in many lands, would as by a miracle transform the whole scene and would in a few years make all Europe, or the greater part of it, as free and happy as Switzerland is today. What is this sovereign remedy? It is to recreate the European fabric, or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, safety and freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe. In this way only will hundreds of millions of toilers be able to regain the simple joys and hopes which make life worth living. The process is simple. All that is needed is the resolve of hundreds of millions of men and women to do right instead of wrong and to gain as their reward blessing instead of cursing.

But Churchill never expected Britain to be a member and remained a nationalist and an imperialist.

WINSTON CHURCHILL

“Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America, and I trust Soviet Russia must be the friends and sponsors of the new Europe and must champion its right to live and shine.”

As Prime Minister in 1953, he was explicit that Britain should not be part of the arrangement. He told the Commons: “Where do we stand? We are not members of the European Defence Community, nor do we intend to be merged in a Federal European system. We feel we have a special relation to both. This can be expressed by prepositions, by the preposition ‘with’ but not ‘of’ – we are with them, but not of them. We have our own Commonwealth and Empire.”

See the very useful materials gathered on Jon Danzig's blog page.  Danzig, however, take the view--which I don't share--that Churchill would have been in favor of British membership in the EU.

A more interesting and important question is the role played by the United States in the project of European Integration. I think the US was key. Every US President from Eisenhower threw until Obama has supported the EU--largely for self-interested reasons. Trump is the exception.

A remarkable feature of the present time--Trump's America, Xi Jinping's China, and Putin's Russia all share one important foreign policy goal--the destruction of the EU. 

For the initial (secret) support of the US foreign policy establishment for the EU, see this article  Richard J. Aldrich. "OSS, CIA and European unity: The American committee on United Europe, 1948-60," Diplomacy and Statecraft.

I will have a lot more to say about US support for the EU in the postwar period (see my "America and European Unity: From Roosevelt to Trump.")

On the Eve of the 2019 General Election

The General Election of December 2019 is weird for a number of reasons. One, it is taking place if not in the dead of winter, then as near as dammit. British elections are usually held in May or June not in cold and rainy December. Two, this will be the third General Election in four years. And three, the General Election will be the second in succession called by a Governing Party that has been unable to enact its legislative agenda.

The graph below (from @tortoise) explains why British politics is currently so weird. The x axis show the relative strength of the Tory (blue dots) and Labour (red dots) vote in each constituency the y axis shows the strength of the leave and remain vote in each constituency. Lots of Labour seats are pro Brexit: many Tory seats are anti-Brexit.

In order to win on Thursday, a Party leader is going to have to forge a winning coalition out of that quadrant. The polls suggest that Boris Johnson has proven more successful at this task than Jeremy Corbyn. Perhaps surprisingly, the collapse of the Lib Dems and Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party has not done much to move the dial. The Labour Party is now roughly where it was in early October—roughly 10 per cent behind the Conservative Party.

Johnson appears to have put together a coalition that includes traditional Tory voters from the shires with the addition of the elderly and the relatively uneducated voters, who, in the wake of Brexit, have abandoned the Labour Party. Corbyn has had some success with the young, but many centerist Remainers remain unconvinced.

My guess is that by Friday morning we will wake up to a clear Johnson victory. We could even see the biggest Tory majority since 1987. If I had to bet, I would put my money on a Tory majority of between 40 and 60 seats.

In any case, for those watching from the USA—326 is the number to watch (650 seats available) That’s the number Johnson needs to form a government. He probably needs 340 for a truly stable government. In May 2017, the Tories won 317; in 2015 330; and in 2010 306)

The other typically exciting think to watch in a British General Election is the defeat of a so-called “big beast” — a leading cabinet minister. If they lose, their political career is immediately over (see Michael Portillo, see Ed Balls). Look for the results in the constituencies of Dominic Raab, Iain Duncan Smith, and even Johnson himself. On the Labour side—look for the results in Yvette Cooper’s constituency.

In my next post, I will speculate about what happens with a Johnson victory and what it means for the US  (note anyone who refers to Johnson as “Boris” is likely a Tory who finds him endearing.)

The Politics of Brexit

Professor Glyn Morgan

SU Abroad—London Program

May-June 2020

Draft Syllabus

The aim of the class is to understand the cultural, historical, socio-economic, and political factors that led Britain to vote to leave the European Union. We will look at the causes, consequences, and the process of Brexit. What do these tell us about British politics and society? How will Britain survive outside of the EU? Will Britain become more dependent on the USA? What does Brexit mean for Scotland, Wales, and Ireland (both Ulster and the Republic? What effect will Brexit have on Britain’s racial and ethnic minorities—including current and future immigrants.

This course will be taught in Faraday House, London. We will have a number of visiting speakers from the political, commercial, and national security worlds. We will also make four short visits within Central London to locations (whether a museum, park, building or market) that symbolize European Britain, Commercial Britain, Imperial Britain, and Post-Imperial Britain.

Class Assignments

Short Quiz based on the reading                                                                                 25% of Grade

A 750 word Blog Post on one of the themes of the class                                            35% of Grade

A 15 Minute self-filmed “documentary” or a 10 page essay on an issue related to Brexit       40%          





There are no required texts to purchase.



There is NO final exam.




TOPICS and READINGS

1.      Britain, Europe, and the EU

The EU (as we now know it) was formed in 1957. Why did it take the UK until 1972 until it joined? When and Why did Britain turn Eurosceptic? When did Eurosceptics become Leavers? Why did David Cameron call a referendum in 2016?

Book:

 

Kevin O’Rourke, A Short History of Brexit (selections)

Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (selections)

Articles/Blogs:

Mathew d'Ancona, “Brexit: How a Fringe Idea Took Hold of the Tory Party,” Guardian June 15 2016.

John Lanchester, ‘Brexit Blues,’ LRB, 38: 15 (2016).

Ivan Rogers (2017), The History and Origins of Brexit

Ivan Rogers (2017), “The Inside Story of How David Cameron drove Britain to Brexit,”

Movies/Documentaries:

•      “How Britain Lost Europe” (FT, December 2016) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oqT1lneQ28Q

•      Them or US (Part One)

•      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lg0LncoE060&t=40s

•      Them Or Us (Part Two)

•      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HD2ypyiBssY&t=2540s

•      The Poisoned Chalice (in Four Parts)

•      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x5Hawmir29w&t=287s

2. Austerity, the Left-behind, and Neo-Liberalism



Some people argue that Brexit was a direct consequence of one or more of the following: (i) “neo-liberal policies” in the period 1997-2008; (ii) The Great Financial Crisis of 2008-2010; and (iii) the Austerity Policies of the Tory Governments 2010-2016. These explanations all emphasize economic causes of Brexit. Are they right to do so? Or is Brexit better explained with reference to cultural factors?

Book

Ian Fraser, Shredded: Inside the Bank that Broke Britain

Simon Wren-Lewis, The Lies We Were Told: Politics, Economics, Austerity, and Brexit (Selections)

Lisa Mackenzie, Getting By (selections)

Articles/Blogs

                       

                        Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism



                        William Davies, Populism and the Limits of Neoliberalism



                        Simon-Wren Lewis, What Brexit and Austerity tell us about Economics, Policy and the Media

John Gray, The Strange Death of Liberal Politics

Movies/Documentaries

The Bank that Almost Broke Britain

John Harris, Anywhere But Westminster

3.       Cultural Change, Immigration, and Integration

Rather than explaining Brexit with reference to economic factors, other scholars argue that Brexit can only be explained by cultural factors, such as immigration.

Book:

Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin, National Populism, (Selections)

David Goodhart, The Road to Somewhere (Selections)

Articles and Blogs

Pippa Norris, “Generation Wars Over Brexit and beyond—how young and old are divided over social values” LSE BLOG

Francis Fuyuyama (1990), “The End of History”*

Francis Fukuyama (2018), “Against Identity Politics,” Foreign Affairs, Aug 2018*

Glyn Morgan, “Immigration, European Integration, and Liberal Political Incorporation,”*

Documentary

“The Truth About Immigration in the UK in 2014,” BBC

4.      Imperial Britain, Post-Imperial Britain and Europe

Some people argue that Brexit can best be explained in terms of a nostalgic longing for empire. This thesis has been best put by the Irish write Fintan O’Toole. Many English writers consider O’Toole’s thesis to be absurd. We look at the debate sparked by hos 2018 book.

            Books

Fintan O Toole, Heroic Failure: Brexit and the Politics of Pain (selections)

Articles/Blogs

Robert Saunders, The Myth of Brexit as Imperial Nostalgia

John Lloyd, Why Fintan O’Toole Has Got Britain all wrong

David Goodhart, “Looking for the Soul of England”

Bella Caledonia, Independence day Postponed

Documentaries[GM1] 

The Windrush Generation

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=izsLi-FB5Fg

5.       The Break-Up of Britain?

The Brexit vote has thrown into question the continuing viability of the Union between England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. We look at the factors holding together the Union and focus in particular on Northern Ireland’s borders both North and South and East and West.

BOOK:

Tony Connelly, Brexit and Ireland (selections)

Articles/Blog

Neil Ascherson, Brexit will finish off the Break-Up of Britain

Rhiannon Lucy Coslett, Brexit is Giving Welsh Nationalism a New Appeal

Roger Iwan Scully, “Brexit and Wales”

           

Tariq Modood, Multiculturalism

Tariq Modood, “Multiculturalism can foster a new kind of post-brexit englishness”

Roger Iwan Scully, “Brexit and Wales”

6.      Political Parties, Parliament, and the Law

Brexit has already had major political implications for the UK party system and for the relationship between government, Parliament, and the Courts. We look at these changes and speculate about their future likely consequence.

BOOK:

Kevin O’Rourke, A Short History of Brexit (selections)

Articles and Blog

Chris Lord, The Brexit Vote has Deepened Britain’s Social Divisions

Andrew Gamble, “Taking Back Control: The Political Implications of Brexit,” Journal of European Public Policy 2019

Andrew Gamble, “The Realignment of British Politics in the Wake of Brexit,” Political Quarterly 2019

Glyn Morgan, “Is the EU a Crap 1950s Idea?” in B. Martill and U. Steiger eds.  Brexit and Beyond (2018)  (A discussion of Dominic Cummings Branching Histories Blog )

Richard Tuck, (2016), “The Left Case for Brexit,” Dissent Magazine, June 6

John Gray, “Brexit has Left the British Political Class Trapped in its own History”

Peter Oborne, “I was a Strong Brexiteer” Open Democracy

7.      Post-Brexit Britain—Trade and Security

Once the UK has finally left the EU (if it ever does), the UK will have to create new trade and security arrangements. Some fear that the UK will become dependent on the USA. What is the likely future of the UK post Brexit? And what does Brexit mean for the future of the EU?



Articles and Blogs

Breugel, Europe in a New World Order

How the EU Works—What is the Single Market?

Faisal Islam, Why the Car Industry is Braced For a Brexit Bumpy Ride

Samuel Marc Lowe, “What Chlorinated Chicken Tells Us About Brexit”

Glyn Morgan, “Europe’s Commercial Order and the Limits of Nationalism”

Anthony Evans Pritchard, “Brexit is About the Supremacy of Parliament and Nothing Else,”

Dani Rodrik, “Brexit and the Globalization Trilemma”

Documentaries

•      “Out and Proud”==Faisal Islam—seen through the lens of Sunderland

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KG5jvQyF5bA

---

 [GM1]