The European Monetary Union--Lecture One

One big question hangs over the discussion of the European Montary Union and its currency the EURO--"Was it a bad idea?"

This question continues to divide scholars,  politicians, and ordinary citizens This question has loomed large esp. after the Greek Crisis 2010-2015 and was a factor in Brexit. (leavers complained that the EU had shafted the Greeks.) Even in recent newspapers, the Head of the Hungarian Central Bank has complained that the EURO must go. (Hungary is of course not a member of the EMU.)

The gist of his argument:

Two decades after the euro’s launch, most of the necessary pillars of a successful global currency — a common state, a budget covering at least 15-20 per cent of the eurozone’s total gross domestic product, a eurozone finance minister and a ministry to go with the post — are still missing. 

We rarely admit the real roots of the ill-advised decision to create the common currency: it was a French snare. As Germany unified, François Mitterrand, then French president, feared growing German power and believed convincing the country to give up its Deutschemark would be enough to avoid a German Europe. The chancellor of the time, Helmut Kohl, gave in and considered the euro the ultimate price for a unified Germany. They were both wrong. 

We now have a European Germany, not a German Europe, and the euro was un­able to prevent the emergence of another strong German power. But the Germans also fell into the trap of the “too good to be true” euro. The inclusion of southern European economies in the eurozone led to an exchange rate that was weak enough to allow the Germans to become the strongest global export machine in the EU. This windfall opportunity made them complacent. They neglected to upgrade their infrastructure or to invest enough in future industries. They missed the digital revolution, miscalculated the emergence of China and failed to build pan-European global companies. At the same time, companies like Allianz, Deutsche Bank and Bayer launched fruitless efforts to conquer Wall Street and the US. 

 Most eurozone countries fared better before the euro than they did with it. According to analysis by the Centre for European Policy, there have been few winners and many losers in the first two decades of the euro. The common currency was not needed for European success stories before 1999 and the majority of eurozone member states did not benefit from it later. During the 2008 financial crisis and the 2011-12 eurozone economic crisis, most members were badly hit, having piled up huge government debts. There is no free lunch and cheap loans often cost a lot later. 

....

The time has come to wake up from this harmful and fruitless dream. A good starting point would be to recognise that the single currency is a trap for practically all its members — for different reasons — not a gold mine. EU states, both in and outside the eurozone, should admit that the euro has been a strategic error. The aim of building a global western currency that vies with the dollar was a challenge to the US. The European vision of a United States of Europe has resulted in both open and hidden US warfare against the EU and the eurozone in the past two decades. We need to work out how to free ourselves from this trap. Europeans must give up their risky fantasies of creating a power that rivals the US. Members of the eurozone should be allowed to leave the currency zone in the coming decades, and those remaining should build a more sustainable global currency. Let’s celebrate the 30th anniversary in 2022 of the Maastricht treaty that spawned the euro by rewriting the pact.  

This is not a view I share.  The historical account is dubious ("a French snare") and--in my opinion-- a United States of Europe is the only way of avoiding subordination to Trump's America, Xi' China, and/or Putin's Russia.

Nonetheless, it is your task to figure out if this Hungarian chap is right.

One point worth noting--the EURO is not unpopular in Europe (although there is quite a lot of variation between different countries):

For a more recent discussion (May 2020) of whether or not the EU was a mistake, see the recent discussion between Stefan Auer, a notorious eurosceptic, and Erik Jones-- two eminent EU scholars.

TIMELINE (from The Guardian)

hares

1

1957
The treaty of Rome creates an early incarnation of the EU - the EEC - and identifies exchange rate policies as a "matter of common concern". Fluctuation between the national currencies was seen as a cause of economic instability. 25.3.1957: Unity plan in Europe

1961
An action committee advocating a united Europe proposes a European monetary reserve system as a step towards creating a single currency, though nothing happens until the next decade.

1969
EEC heads of state agree to establish an economic and monetary union by 1980.

Advertisement

1970
In a move now seen as the start of monetary union, a report by Luxembourg's prime minister, Pierre Werner, suggests that the community moves to a single economy in 10 years, with a fixed exchange rate but no single currency. It is accepted but implementation falters as the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates between the US dollar and European currencies collapses.
19.10.1970: EEC plan a step to political unity

1972
European currencies - including those of non-EEC members - are linked through a "monetary snake", which permits currencies to move against each other within a 4.5% limit. But the 1973-74 oil price crisis forces out sterling, the Italian lira and French franc under pressure from the dollar.
8.3.1972: Six agree on monetary union deal

1979
The snake, by now including only Germany, Denmark and the Benelux countries, is replaced by the European monetary system (EMS). At its core is the exchange rate mechanism (ERM), designed to prevent anything but minor fluctuations between participating currencies. The European currency unit (Ecu) is introduced as an average of the participating currencies.
14.3.1979: EMS starts off with only a whimper

1989
European Community heads of state meet in Madrid and agree to implement economic and monetary union (Emu) in the three steps proposed by the head of the commission, Jacques Delors.
18.4.1989: Delors' plan

Advertisement

1990
Emu stage one begins with the liberalisation of capital transactions and increased cooperation between national banks. Margaret Thatcher takes Britain into the ERM at what some analysts warn is an inflated rate.
8.10.1990: First step on the road towards full European monetary union

1992
February
The Maastricht Treaty, negotiated in the last months of 1991, is signed, setting out a path to the single currency. With January 1999 as the last allowable date for its introduction. Britain secures an opt-out from this final stage and the Danes reject it in a referendum.
12.12.1991: Maastricht Treaty hailed as great leap forward despite Major concessions

September
Currency speculation on "Black Wednesday" forces a run on the overvalued pound and John Major takes Britain out of the ERM.
17.9.1992: Pound drops out of ERM

1993
The ERM is suspended in August and relaunched in a looser form.
2.8.1993: EC surrenders battle for ERM
26.8.1993: Leader: Mapping the new Europe

1994
January
Emu stage two begins with the establishment of the European monetary institute (EMI) as a forerunner to the European central bank (ECB). Member states commit themselves to working towards currency convergence criteria.

April
Finance ministers settle on introducing the single currency in January 1999, with a three to four year transition period before the national currency notes and coins are replaced.
11.1.1994: Financial Notebook: Birth rites

1995
Heads of state and government decide on "euro" as the name for the new currency.
20.12.1995: European press reaction to naming of the currency

1998
The European Commission recommends 11 countries to participate in the first wave of monetary union: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The ECB is set up in Frankfurt and the exchange rates between the euro and national currencies are fixed on December 31.
31.12.1998, leader: The euro has landed

Advertisement

1999
January 1
The euro comes into effect and the ECB takes over responsibility for monetary policy from central banks. It is principally used for non-cash transactions but the 11 currencies of the member states - such as the franc, peseta and lira - have ceased to exist in their own right and are now simply its subdivisions.
2.1.1999: Euro love is not enough

In the first half of the year the new currency, which was worth $1.17 on its launch, slides towards parity with the dollar and drops beneath it in December.
7.12.1999: Euro edges back above dollar

2000
The ECB intervenes for the first time in September to prop up the euro, which had lost 30% of its value against the dollar in its short life. A week later the Danes say no to joining the single currency in a referendum.
23.9.2000: Three strikes to save single currency

2001
January 1
Greece joins the euro.

August 30
Final design of euro banknotes unveiled. Mass advertising campaign begins, and notes and coins are distributed to major banks.
30.8.2001: ECB unveils euro notes and coins

December
Notes and coins are sent to retailers for training staff and mini-kits of notes and coins are distributed to the public.

2002
January 1
Euro notes and coins become legal tender in 12 countries and "dual circulation" begins.

January 28
The guilder ceases to be legal tender in the Netherlands.

February 9
The punt ceases to be legal tender in Ireland.

February 17
The franc ceases to be legal tender in France.

February 28
National currencies cease to be legal tender in remaining nine eurozone countries.

March 1
The euro is the only legal tender in 12 European countries.

June 30
Smaller banks stop exchanging national banknotes for euros.

October 9
The European Commission recommends that the EU accept 10 new member countries.

November 29
Euro hold-out Sweden sets a date for a national referendum on joining the single currency: September 14 2003.

2003
June 9
The chancellor, Gordon Brown, announces whether or not the five economic tests for Britain to join the euro have been met.

2012
January 1
National notes and coins may no longer be exchanged for free.

The Werner Report 1970 (initially discussed at the Hague 1969) represented the first proposal to set up a Monetary Union between the then 6 member states.  A contemporaneous article notices the federalist implications of the plan:

The Werner Committee's plan for economic and monetary union in the Common Market covers 31 pages. Its fundamental objective is "that the principal economic decisions affecting the EEC will be taken at community level, and that the necessary powers will be transferred to the community [i.e. will be transferred to the supranational level of government]."

The report envisages that by 1980 the Community would formulate budgets, tax policies, and monetary policies; and that there would be a uniform tax system throughout the Community.

It recognises that the transfer of these responsibilities to the Community has "a fundamental political significance and implies the progressive development of political union. The economic and monetary union, therefore, has to be seen as a generator for the development of a political union."

The document says that those must understand its objectives who subscribe to the project, and accept them without equivocation: "Political and monetary unification is an irreversible process and it is essential to go into it with a firm will to achieve it and to accept all its political as well as economic implications."

The Werner Report was shelved, mainly because of a series of global economic crises of the 1970s, including:

--the monetary crisis in 1971 (non-convertibility of the US dollar);

-- the first oil crisis in 1973;

-- the iron and steel crisis in 1974;

 --the economic crisis in 1975;

 --and the second oil crisis in 1979.

1979-1991 European Monetary System (EMS)

"The European Monetary System (EMS) was built on the concept of stable but adjustable exchange rates defined in relation to the newly created European Currency Unit (ECU) – a basket currency based on a weighted average of EMS currencies . Within the EMS, currency fluctuations were controlled through the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) and kept within ±2 .25% of the central rates, with the exception of the lira, which was allowed to fluctuate by ±6% ."

A new plan took shape in 1988 and was published as the Delors Report in 1989.

The idea of a European Monetary Union faced intellectual and political obstacles.

The intellectual obstacles came from economists, who in the 1960s and 1970s had formulated a theory of an Optimum Currency Area (OCA). For a useful summary of this theory, read pages 1-6 of Francesco Paolo Mongelli, “European Economic and Monetary Integration, and the Optimum Currency Area Theory.’’

Crudely stated, OCA—the work of economists like Robert Mundel, Peter Kenen, Ronald Mackinnon and others—sought to identify the conditions necessary for an economic area to share a common currency. Conditions include:

--price and wage flexibility

--mobility of factors of production (capital and labour)

 –product diversification

--openness

--financial integration

--fiscal transfers

--similarity of preferences concerning savings, debt, and life/work balance

--solidarity: are we a community of destiny? do we share your costs?

Why would a group of sovereign states want to set up a monetary union with a common currency?

ADVANTAGES:

1. Eliminate Transaction Costs--check out the currency exchange rates in an airport
2. Eliminate Currency Risk
3. Increases Global/Regional Power--Seniorage
4. Strengthens the Independence of the Central bank
5. Speeds up Economic Integration
6. Speeds up Political Integration (Ever Closer Union)

DISADVANTAGES

1. Countries give up the flexibility of exchange rate depreciation.
2. Absent currency depreciation; countries must rely upon wage deflation.
3. Very difficult to leave a Monetary Union--the Hotel California Problem (see Barry Eichengreen, The Euro: Love It or Leave It; and for a more detailed version, here)

Many economists pointed out in the 1990s that the EU lacked these conditions and a common currency wouldn’t work.

One can go through the 6 conditions of an OCA and argue that some or all are absent.

Source: Baldwin and Wiplosz (2011)

Among the most prescient critics:

Bernard Connolly, The Rotten Heart of Europe (1995)—(this guy was ignored for 15 years, a paraiah in EU circles, until the Greek crisis proved him right)  see interviews and profiles  here and here and here and here

Martin Feldstein, “EMU and International Conflict” (1997)

____  "The Political Economy of the EMU,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall 1997*

These economic objections were dismissed by pro-EU scholars, including this one published—with sad irony—in November 2009 just as the wheels were coming off. (Lars Jonung and Eoin Drea, It can't Happen, It's a Bad Idea, It Won't last: US economists on the Euro 1989-2002)