The Idea of a European Superstate after Brexit and Trump
Notes for a Talk Delivered for Tocqueville Association June 29 2017, American University Paris
My question is this:
“What form should Europe take in the wake of Brexit and Trump?”
Setting Brexit and Trump aside for the moment, there
are—crudely stated—three different ways of thinking about the postwar political
shape of Europe:
1.
A Europe of nation-states that
fiercely guard their sovereignty (this is the Europe favoured by Nigel Farage
and Madame Le Pen);
2. An intergovernmental Europe that
recognizes the centrality of nation-states, but which also establishes shared
sovereignty over key economic functions (including trade and monetary
policy)—the EU in its current form resembles this; and
3. A Federal Europe that deprives current
nations of their sovereignty over a wide range of functions, including taxation
and spending, defense and foreign policy. This Federal Europe—called by its enemies A European Superstate or A United States of Europe—is an aspiration
of federalists but is widely dismissed as an impractical or utopian project.
I want to structure my answer around three Tocquevillean
themes:
1. New Types of Political Organization call
for new ways of thinking, a new Political Science.
Tocqueville had in mind the new political
form assumed by the new states, which managed to combine a democratic society
and a decentralized republican form of self-government.
From the perspective of historical
sociology, we can identify a range of different political forms to have emerged
in Europe over the last 1000, including the Medieval Regnum; the City State;
the Absolute Monarchy; the Multinational Empire; the Constitutional Democracy;
and—although it is difficult to situate it as a type—the European Union
(EU).
The EU has been described as the first
fundamentally new macro-political form to emerge in over 500 years. The EU poses an intellectual challenge for a
number of reasons:
(i)
it is in a constant state of flux (adding and
subtracting members; adding but rarely subtracting powers or competences),
(ii)
it is not clear whether or how long it will
survive; and
(iii)
it co-exists in perhaps a predatorial
relationship with Europe’s nation-states.
Perhaps more intellectually challenging still, we do not have a clear
idea what is required to maintain this new type of political organization. Does
it need a shared language? Does it need common educational programs?
2. Geography Matters.
Tocqueville was very conscious of the role
that America’s geographical position played in making possible its
decentralized republican form of government.
But he also saw the limitations of this form of government were it
transplanted to Europe, which had a very different geographical position. As he
noted:
A people which in the presence of the great military monarchies of Europe
should divide its sovereignty into fractional parts would, in my opinion, by
that very act abdicate its power and perhaps its existence and its name.
It remains a contested question whether the
EU needs its own more potent military force. It is uncontestable, however, that
Europe finds itself in a precarious geographical position. It is bounded on its
Eastern border by Putin’s Russia; and is bounded on its Southern border by the
Mediterranean and further South by the failed and failing states of Northern
Africa.
Geographical positions, in short, pose
opportunities and challenges. Tocqueville’s
insight was to recognize that a form of government that worked for America
might not work, at least in precisely the same form, in Europe. For better or worse, Europe confronts a much
more challenging geographical position than the USA, a position that poses
major security and immigration problems.
3. Centralization is sometimes advantageous and
sometimes disadvantageous.
One of Tocqueville’s great themes in Democracy in America and the The Old Regime is the impact of
centralization on liberty, patriotism, and the quality of government.
Tocqueville drew a useful distinction
between political and administrative centralization.
II
The Challenge of Brexit and Trump
In different ways B and T challenge core elements of the
post-war Western global order. That
order rested on the following three elements:
(i)
Rule-based multilateral trade regime—aim to
lower tariffs and promote regulated trade;
(ii)
NATO—an asymmetrical military alliance run by
the Americans partly on behalf of the Europeans—held together by the glue of
fear of the Soviet Union;
(iii)
EU—an American backed project to increase
European unity and bind Europe around the core values of democracy and market
capitalism.
Trump—at least in his Bannon/Breitbart clothes—is a major
threat to this post-war global order.
The Five Elements of Trumpism
1.
America First—whether in trade relations or in
security-matters;
2.
Nationalist Internationalism—allies with other
nationalists—Putin, Modi;
3.
Anti-Immigrant Ethnocentrism—friendly with Nigel
Farage; supports both Brexit and the break-up of the EU;
4.
Anti-NATO--Seeks new alliance structures—alliances
with Russia and closer ties with Saudia Arabia
5.
Anti-European values—human rights, climate
change, multiculturalism, --see Pew Study.
Brexit presents less of a set of challenges than a set of
opportunities.
Brexit—the harder the better—is the best thing that has
happened to the EU in years.
Brexit provides other European states to recover many of the
jobs lost to the UK’s low-wage, regulation-light economic model.
Brexit provides the EU with a chance to centralize in areas
that the UK blocked.
III
How Should European Union Respond to Brexit and Trump
1.
Need to
bargain hard against the UK, which is seeking “to have its cake and eat it”—the
benefits of Switzerland and the burdens of Canada.
2.
Need to “soft balance” against Trump’s USA—need
to throw sand in America’s wheels—seek domestic allies within the US—eg pro
climate control Mayors and Governers.
3.
Need to rethink the shape of global alliances,
especially if the US allies with Russia and India and Japan against China;
4.
Most importantly, the EU needs to rethink NATO
and be prepared to assume control of its own destiny;
5.
None of these things are possible without the EU
becoming more powerful, which, I think, requires more Tocquevillean
centralization.
